analysis of the health sector reform has been referred to as the sanitaristas (Weyland, 1995; Arretche, 2010) . In the social sciences, the 'policy community' of experts is defined as the set of individuals spread across government agencies, research departments and institutes, political parties, non-governmental organisations and interest groups that act within a specific public policy area (Majone, 1989) . The sanitaristas exhibited the features of a policy community as described in the literature, in light of their specific role in the national debate on reorganisation of the health system.
From the perspective of social status, the more relevant sanitarista trait was their position as teachers and researchers at public agencies and universities. In the 1980s, the sanitaristas held a very special place in the state structure: they enjoyed the conditions of a Weberian organisational bureaucracy (particularly job stability), combined with the decision-making autonomy typical of professional and academic bureaucracies. Their professional isolation was reinforced by the expressive participation of medical doctors from the academic sphere who were at the helm of the SR. The influence wielded by the sanitaristas' social and professional status was crucial to the scope of the SR.
As analysts of the Brazilian health system, the sanitaristas displayed singular attributes: they worked in a specialised area and shared the worldview and independence of a professional public bureaucracy. Their policy analysis, which led to the adoption of a project of universalist right to health within the 1980s atmosphere of democratic transition, was undertaken inside the state apparatus and not based on a massive mobilisation of civil society or the social movement. The international 2 literature has not ignored the role of policy analysis by the specialised public bureaucracy (Dobuzinskis, et al, 2007) .
It should also be emphasised that the sanitaristas carried influence primarily because their policy analysis was opportune, timely and propositional. Nevertheless, their successful formation and implementation of a political agenda was not grounded in the mass dissemination of longstanding, consolidated 'scientific evidence' that lent legitimacy to the proposed health system reform. Explorations of the role of expert communities highlight the use of scientific authority to overcome doubts about the adequacy or plausibility of public policy implementation. Reliance on scientific evidence is usually necessary when decision-makers cannot fully distinguish true from false (Haas, 1992) . Majone points out, however, that scientific evidence alone is not enough to legitimize the options offered by policy analysis. Specialists have to convince social actors within the diverse realms where they propose to act, and in this case, arguments are more efficacious than scientific evidence (Majone, 1989) .
According to Hall (1989) , one must account for the circumstances that afford the dissemination of innovative ideas. With this perspective in mind, the present chapter shows that the SR was the product of the organisation of new political subjects who took advantage of Brazil's pro-democratisation environment in the 1980s and defined the SUS as an institutional objective by means of arguments.
Why did these arguments win out? The national political elites accepted the SUS project in a conjuncture where an authoritarian regime was in crisis and democratic transition was on the order of the day . There were three essential features to the Brazilian institutional process that enabled the sanitaristas to act so efficaciously. First, there was no veto power against a sectoral policy agenda by relevant social actors, like the corporatist trade union sector that had controlled social security and access to individual medical care down through the history of the republic.
In the course of the authoritarian regime, unions had suffered specific, concentrated losses that cast worker representatives out of the decision-making process within the sphere of social security and, consequently, out of the decision-making process concerning the organisation of medical care. Malloy shows that Brazil's post-1964 authoritarian military regime worked diligently to control the labour movement (Malloy, 1979) .
Second, the bankruptcy of the authoritarian regime's centralised decision making automatically brought into the political arena the voices of leaders of the 3 legislative and judicial branches; states and municipalities, that is, federative levels that were then secondary; and coalitions of sectoral experts. From the perspective of the federation, authoritarian centralisation undermined states and municipalities of the possibility of social intervention in three ways: by concentrating financial resources in the hands of the federal executive, by defining general norms applicable to social policies and by subjecting applications for federal funds to federal government approval, thus avoiding any automatic transfer of such funds (Draibe, 1999) .
Third, in their arguments about the FC1988, the sanitaristas received the support of the democratizing political elite that defended redemption of the Brazilian 'social debt'. At the time, Jaguaribe and other intellectual leaders, for example, argued that a stable democracy would not be viable in Brazil until the 'yawning chasm between the great masses and the upper strata of the population was substantially reduced' (Jaguaribe, et al, 1986, p 15 ).
In the context of democratic transition, the scope of institutional choices was greatly broadened, temporarily suspending structural constraints on changes in public policies. Interest groups found themselves able to wield influence in the management of new policies. Collective action gained pluralist form, as described by Granados and Knoke (2005) , given the heavy competition between emerging interest groups and the fragmentation of power. The transfer of political coordination to the constitutional process reduced the authoritarian government's role in interest mediation.
In the paradigm theory approach to public agenda setting, the policy window is the moment when advocates of unique proposals 'push' their solutions to problems.
Within this window, entrepreneurs act decisively to link solutions to problems, overcoming constraints by adapting proposals to circumstances (Kingdon, 2003) . In this regard, the period of democratic transition in Brazil offered a window for new institutional choices in public health policy given the fragmentation of the sectoral arena and the weak veto power held by relevant interest groups, especially trade unions, as mentioned earlier, or even healthcare companies or organisations that benefitted from the military regime. In light of this picture, the health sector could be taken over by 'public policy entrepreneurs'.
Authoritarianism, national developmentalism and health policy 4
Over the course of its existence, Brazilian authoritarianism was not completely omissive when it came to the social question. It engaged in redistributive efforts especially during the second half of the 1970s. This intervention was a response to criticisms that the regime's social policy was bankrupt, especially in health. Two sure signs of how its social policy was indeed bankrupt were the increased infant mortality rate noted in the city of São Paulo in the late 1960s -at the height of a cycle of steady economic growth in GDP touted by the regime as the 'Brazilian economic miracle' -and the devastating effects of the 1974 meningitis epidemic (Malloy, 1979) Santos has identified a substantial strengthening of social protection following creation of the MPAS (Santos, 1979) . Noronha and Levcovitz see the Prompt Action Plan (Plano de Pronta Ação/PPA) as an inclusive initiative in health assistance that yielded 'an unprecedented rise in the production of services' after 1974 (Noronha and Levcovitz, 1994, p 78) .
In 1977, the increased complexity of the social security system led to the establishment of the National Social Security and Assistance System (Sistema Nacional de Previdência e Assistência Social/SINPAS), which comprised the Financial Administration Institute (Instituto de Administração Financeira/IAPS), the National Social Security Institute (Instituto Nacional de Previdência Social/INPS) and the National Social Security Healthcare Institute (Instituto Nacional de Assistência Médica/INAMPS). INAMPS was charged with providing individual health care to urban workers, government employees and rural workers (Braga and Paula, 1981) .
The universalisation of social security made it an imperative to ensure that health services like hospitals and clinics were accessible to an unexpectedly large contingent of the population. Malloy shows that Brazilian social security encompassed 80% of Brazil's urban population (Malloy, 1979) . The self-employed, housemaids and the rural population were no longer denied access to social security health services. This attempt at mass provision of social citizenship required investments in the supply of new medical services. The authoritarian regime opted to rely on combinations of the public and private spheres to expand social security services (Braga and Paula, 1981) . Nevertheless, the military regime had such a tenuous hold on legitimacy that the Executive was capable neither of garnering recognition nor of providing intellectual leadership in sectoral initiatives. It should, however, be pointed out that the social policy debate in the latter half of the 1970s was no longer restricted to the issue of social inclusion (Santos, 1979) . Social policy reflection had turned to new questions: excess spending and the inefficient allocation of public resources. Weyland is perspicacious in his understanding of the complexity of this new scenario:
Health professionals and experts from academia and research institutes criticized this unequal and wasteful model of health care ever more vocally. In the mid 1970s, they formed a 'sanitary movement' demanding profound reform. This social movement attributed the problems of the established system to its heavy reliance on the private sector. It therefore called for strengthening the public sector in order to guarantee all citizens equal rights and effective access to health care and to shift the emphasis from curative treatments to preventive measures, such as vaccination and sanitation. … It would also limit the explosion of health spending by diminishing the need for the expensive treatment of people falling ill with diseases that are easy to prevent. (Weyland, 1995, p 15) The author highlights criticisms of the initial scholarship produced by the sanitaristas regarding the Brazilian military's national developmentalist decision to favour private companies in the expansion of hospitals and specialised clinics by authorizing social security to purchase goods and services from them. Policy analysis in health thus dialogued with decisions that broadened Brazil's social protection structure in the 1970s while not, however, recognizing these decisions as legitimate or even necessary.
The legitimacy crisis faced by the health sector expansion model jeopardized the late social protection system shaped by the authoritarian regime, modelled on a partnership between the state and private companies that provided health services to the social security system. Noronha and Levcovitz note that there was disagreement about the model even within the social security bureaucracy itself (Noronha and Levcovitz, 1994) . 
Policy analysis by the sanitaristas
The intellectual foundations of the SR were informed primarily by the results of research contracted by FINEP (Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos), a body of the federal executive branch headquartered in the city of Rio de Janeiro that was responsible for executing a portion of the program to modernize scientific and technological research under the Geisel administration (Costa, 1992) .
Although the sanitaristas had bureaucratic ties to the state apparatus of an authoritarian regime, their scientific production was paradoxically focused on deconstruction of the government's medical assistance policy. For the sanitaristas, more than serving as an instrument for broadening social protection, the expansion of health assistance as fostered by the regime subordinated the health sector to the logic of capitalist development in unacceptable terms. Oliveira and Teixeira provide examples of the functional-structural perspective that underpinned the veto of arrangements combining the state sphere and the health market in that context. For the authors, the expansion of social security within the sphere of health was part of the accumulation process, facilitated by the special blending of state and monopoly capital in Brazil.
Oliveira and Teixeira identified three unique features of this arrangement between social policy and accumulation. The first was the extension of social security coverage to encompass almost all of Brazil's urban population as well as part of its rural; the second was the favouring of curative, individual, welfare-based and specialised medicine in detriment to preventive public health measures of collective interest; and third, the formation of a medical-industrial complex, responsible for the high rates of capital accumulation by large international monopolies in the area of medications and medical equipment manufacture (Oliveira and Teixeira, 1985) .
Within the same institutional context, Cordeiro's early 1980s policy analysis emphasised the process of capitalisation of medical practice, which was to forge links between the institutions that provided healthcare and trained human resources and the emerging medical-industrial complex that produced drugs and equipment (Cordeiro, 1980) .
The author states:
The material foundations for the privatisation of medicine, a process that stepped up pace as of 1976, lay in both the for-profit and not-forprofit private hospital sectors. … This policy option took as its rational 7 justification the existence of a private hospital sector … together with growing demand generated by the incorporation of large contingents of urban wage earners into the social security system. (Cordeiro 1980, p. 162) Those in scientific research enjoyed paradoxical intellectual autonomy that allowed them to reaffirm the functional-structural theoretical perspective that tied growing state provision of health services to accumulation. Scientific research by the sanitaristas reaffirmed structuralist representations of the relation between the economy and politics then dominating the Brazilian social sciences. In 1973, for example, Donnangelo, a preeminent intellectual in social science research in health that decade, stated:
The following can be identified as the prime means through which state interference has preserved the private sector: by sustaining quantitatively and qualitatively greater demand through concentrated manipulation of resources; by guaranteeing the continuity and expansion, under private control, of a network of services that progressively incorporates modern technology; and by keeping private producers in direct control of production processes. (Donnangelo, 1975, p 37) The author did warn, however, that the preferential treatment accorded the private producer was constrained by the need to reconcile it with guarantees that wage earners would be able to access and consume services. Still, this same advantage rendered policy decisions less permeable to rationalisation and concentrated pressure on the state to expand the sphere of private action (Donnangelo, 1975) .
What is particularly intriguing about the experience of the sanitaristas is that the constitutional process demanded institutional arguments that would justify the sectoral reform project. Such arguments were in fact produced, but the imperative of the institutional agenda distanced sanitarista policy analysis from the anti-capitalist representations found in their initial intellectual production.
Within the constitutional process, the sanitaristas' policy analysis became diffused at a national level through two bodies that in the 1970s brought together professors and researchers at the departments of social or preventive medicine within state or federal medical schools and at Fiocruz's National Public Health School (ENSP):
the Brazilian Centre for Health Studies (Centro Brasileiro de Estudos de Saúde/CEBES) 8 and the Brazilian Post-Graduate Association in Collective Health (Associação Brasileira de Pós-Graduação em Saúde Coletiva/ABRASCO). Even though the sanitaristas were intellectually independent, their social status as part of the public bureaucracy demanded they create these two civil bodies in order to disseminate their reform agenda.
In the 1970s, the authoritarian regime still had the power to limit direct political activism by public organisations.
CEBES was founded in 1976 as an outgrowth of Revista Saúde em Debate. As Cohn has pointed out, its members were academics or health professionals from the public sector whose chosen focus of policy analysis was reform of the health system from the perspective of universalisation and equity under the aegis of the state. Two CEBES' sectoral reform proposal was further fortified by the successful experimentalism in health management practiced by municipal governments. In the frail and restricted federative context that outlived the military regime, the sanitaristas enthusiastically disseminated experiences in the organisation of health care by progressive municipal governments. Municipal governments adopted the proposals to expand primary care that were disseminated through channels of interaction within the public health policy community. At this stage, the development of municipal policy depended above all on the idiosyncratic characteristics of local governments and 10 progressive municipal leaders (Costa, et al, 2011) . Municipalism soon became a fundamental value on the democratizing agenda of the sanitaristas: the Integrated Health Actions (Ações Integradas de Saúde/AIS) policy, in place during the brief period of democratic transition, reinforced the policy community's localist outlook. In 1986, 2,500 municipalities threw their support behind the Integrated Health Actions proposal (Noronha and Levcovitz, 1994) . I have received a number of proposals from all areas. Of the proposals I received, in the health area, perhaps the most wide-ranging of all is
[that] of the National Commission for Sanitary Reform, a proposal already in constitutional terms. I ask Your Honour's permission to read the proposal, which goes as follows: Art. 1 -Health is a right guaranteed by the state to all inhabitants of the national territory without distinction. (Mosconi, 1987, p 6) The recommendations of the 8th CNS ratified CEBES' and ABRASCO's theses that the health of each individual is a collective interest, that the state's duty in health should be given priority treatment in social policies and that the right to health and equal access should be extended to actions and services to promote, protect and recover health at all levels of complexity (Comissão Nacional da Reforma Sanitária, 1987). The 8 th CNS reiterated the need to change the historical standard of government action in health through the decentralisation of health services at sub-national levels.
To fund the new Unified Health System, the 8 th CNS proposed that the sector be allocated 'a minimum percentage over public revenue' or 'a minimum percentage equal to 15% of public revenue' (Comissão Nacional da Reforma Sanitária, 1987, p 24). The The chapter on health in the FC1988 and its subsequent laws and administrative rulings would essentially ratify the organisational engineering that followed from the sanitarista policy community's proposition (see Attachment A). The FC1988 continues to hold the idea of health as a universal, equal right delivered through promotion, protection and recovery actions (Brasil, 1988) . From the angle of systemic organisation, the FC1988 adopted the proposal for a unified, decentralised, integrated system with social participation (Brasil, 1988) . 
Conclusion
Assessments of development of the SUS in the 1990s were overridingly pessimistic. It is widely, and surprisingly, maintained that the reform unfolded under precarious conditions and was incomplete, distorting its formulators' original conception. It is generally argued that there is a dissociation between the formulation and implementation of the SR. In this regard, the literature has stressed the complex relation between the public and private spheres. Paim (2008) (Paim, et al, 2011 (Paim, et al, , p 1778 . Now, more than twenty years after enactment of the FC1988, the Brazilian health system has solidified into a hybrid system. The prevalence of funding for private insurance and out-of-pocket pay for medical care by families is pushing the sector towards organisational fragmentation. At the level of collective action, the institutionality of the FC1988 has served merely as a civic reference for individuals who can use it to ensure enforcement of the right to universal access to health care and to expensive medications.
Some authors have endeavoured to attribute the dissociation between the formulation and implementation of the SUS to Brazil's historical legacy of individual medical care. The origin of health care, grounded on differentiation in the realm of Brazil's retirement and pension institutes, has not favoured the Brazilian working class's universalist values of solidarity (Cohn and Elias, 2003; Menicucci, 2006) .
Others underline the constraints of developing an agenda based on the expansion of the state's role and of public spending in the early 1990s environment of monetary stability and fiscal adjustment (Pereira, 1996) . From this viewpoint, even the theme of federative decentralisation is seen as an expression of the minimal state agenda that was part of the executive branch's neoliberal project in the 1990s (Ugá, 1997) . Gerschman and Pereira, proponents of this perspective, hold that the SR coincided with a new era of Brazilian liberalism, where social policies were subordinated to macro-economic policy (Gerschman, 1997; Pereira, 1996) .
From another prism, Diniz underscores how the new Brazilian democracy broke with a rigid state institutionality that showed little potential for political incorporation.
The new democracy brought a multi-faceted system of interest representation, rendering anachronistic the model of the omnipotent, concentrating state (Diniz, 1997) .
Furthermore, the new political party system was to support segmentation in the composition of interests (Vianna, 1998 ).
Menicucci (2006) and Vianna (1998) call special attention to the role of the trade union movement, which did not support the SR, immersed as it was in the contradictions between an egalitarian ideological posture and the defence of corporatist interests. Concomitant with implementation of the SR, the demand for private medical care became an item on the collective bargaining agenda of various trade unions, constituting an 'implicit veto' of the reform's public, universal model (Vianna, 1998; Menicucci, 2006) . Faveret and Oliveira (1990) , on the other hand, raise the hypothesis of excluding universalisation, that is, when the SUS was set up, the preferential option for providing care to the poor distanced the middle class and unions from state-based care. Public underfunding and the massification of access prompted social actors with stronger voices to exit the public sphere. The authors see the entrenchment of the private health care insurance market as a consequence of the strategy of focusing the SUS on the poor and of limiting services (Faveret and Oliveira, 1990) .
A less sceptical reading of the performance of the SUS ties into the decentralisation experience. Arretche defends the thesis that the SR was especially successful in establishing federative decentralisation. She notes that local autonomy in program management, incentivized by the Ministry of Health, created institutional opportunities for government leaders to implement decisions in tune with their own preferences within the realm of the SUS (Arretche, 2002; . The preferences of municipal executives have not produced any collective ill will; the main advances in health indicators in Brazil are seen as attributable to the decentralisation process (Falleti, 2010; Hunter and Sugiyama, 2009 ).
The social sciences recognize the public bureaucracy's ability to put in place distributive developmentalist policies (Evans, 1999 This chapter has shown that the SR proposal included an agenda of a redistributive nature, which clashed openly with the distributive decisions of Brazil's authoritarian regime, in the grips of a legitimacy crisis. There is no doubt that implementation of a redistributive agenda under the SR in the context of the new democracy would mean specific, concentrated losses for entrepreneurial sectors and health professionals. The literature on redistributive institutional models is, however, sceptical about the public bureaucracy's ability to enforce a redistributive agenda on its own, without the acquiescence of social groups that wield obstructionist power (EspingAndersen, 1996) . The analysis of the institutional limits of redistributive public policies in Brazil presents a challenge to the SR's epistemic community today.
